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The international and internationalizing dimensions of culture—from the 
political to the popular—are today the focus of unprecedented scholarly atten-
tion. Paradoxically, a "post-modern age" which celebrates egalitarian diversity 
and subjectivity is confronted with the homogenizing authority of economic 
liberalism, Western values, and popular culture—a process linked at every level 
with the triumph of American power and example. Victory in the Cold War has 
been interpreted as marking the end of ideological contest, or even, more glibly, 
as the End of History. America's triumph has signalled the universal victory of 
forces which Francis Fukuyama has labelled interchangeably "economic and 
political liberalism," "the Western idea," "consumerist Western culture," "mod-
ern liberalism," and "Western liberal democracy."1 Where once American 
hegemony from the military to the ideological was proposed, more recent 
analyses emphasize globalization and/or modernizing and post-modernizing 
processes. However, the American example, if not naked American power, is 
still usually seen as implicated most deeply in these fundamental expressions of 
cultural change. Many Americanists and students of popular culture are con-
vinced that in the late twentieth century one nation has emerged as the principal 
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source of an homogenizing global culture. As Todd Gitlin has observed: 
"American popular culture is the closest approximation there is today to a global 
lingua franca, drawing especially the urban and urbane classes of most nations 
into a federated culture zone. American popular culture is the latest in a long 
succession of bidders for global unification." (Or, perhaps, the world is culturally 
bi-lingual with "American as its second language.")2 
The power of the U.S. abroad is increasingly understood as a consequence 
of its cultural and ideological authority or appeal. Even conservatives, such as 
Joseph Nye, have argued that traditional uses of military force and diplomacy are 
of declining importance in maintaining America's role as the dominant world 
state. Instead he identifies "soft power," America's "cultural and ideological 
appeal," as the basis for its international authority in a post-Cold War world. 
Writing from a much less celebratory position, Gitlin has observed that "The 
dominance of American popular culture is a soft dominance—in a certain sense 
a collaboration,"3 between the more and the less powerful economies and 
cultures. Other nationalities have also lamented this assumed process: the West 
German film-maker, Wim Wenders, has one of his characters proclaim that "the 
Americans have colonized our consciousness" (in Kings of the Road, itself 
paying ironic homage to the Hollywood "road" movie); the British sociologist, 
Stuart Hall, has spoken of a world "dreaming itself to be American"; and Jean 
Baudrillard has claimed, "America is the original version of modernity. We are 
the dubbed or subtitled version."4 
Many commentators, from Austria to Australia, have argued that the 
"Americanization" of popular culture after 1945 was the principal, even the 
necessary, precursor to "the political, military and economic success of the 
United States in the Cold War."5 While seldom defined, so-called "American-
ization" has been widely invoked as the process most responsible for what is seen 
as the growing homogeneity and interdependence of cultures. In the eyes of many 
representatives of Western states with close links to metropolitan America, it is 
also the process most responsible for the erosion of cultural diversity, ideological 
difference, and at times, political sovereignty. Typical of these claims are those 
made with growing frequency about Australia. Given its geographical homol-
ogy, European migration, military alliances, and modern suburban consumerist 
culture, the Anglophone, strategically insecure Pacific continent was arguably 
less ambivalent about Americanization and more open to it than were other 
Western nations. Nationalist historian Geoffrey Série, for example, has written 
of Australia as "more vulnerable to "Américanisation" than any other country. 
. . . Britain, France, Mexico, Canada all are to some extent insulated from 
Américanisation in ways we are not."6 
Although written against a background of his nation's involvement along-
side the U.S. in Vietnam, Serle's words echoed those of generations of Austra-
lians who had invoked America as either a Utopian ideal or a dystopian warning. 
From early in the nineteenth century the theme of Australia as "the future 
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America of the Southern hemisphere" resonated through local political dis-
courses on republicanism, federation, immigration, suffrage, social reform, and 
security.7 For over a century, before the Pearl Harbor attack drew Australia and 
the U.S. into a critical alliance in the Pacific, the two nations were linked in 
myriad ways by shared political values and cultural forms. For many antipodean 
radicals and reformers, the models provided by Republican America, Progressiv-
ism or the New Deal helped to qualify the authority of British influences on local 
political culture and contests. At the same time, popular cultural practices were 
influenced profoundly in colonial and federated Australia by examples and ideas 
drawn from its New World cousin across the Pacific. This influence was felt in 
such diverse cultural fields as vaudeville and theatre; literature and comic books; 
vocabulary and accent; radio and film; advertising; painting; popular music; 
sport; fashion; magazines; suburban design and architecture. On the eve of World 
War II, Australia's "little Digger," former Prime Minister Billy Hughes, told a 
U.S. audience: "What we are, you were; and what you are we hope to be." 
Not all nationalists welcomed the American model. In the interwar years 
"penetration" by U.S. culture had evoked articulate resistance within Australia. 
W.A. Payne protested in 1930: "Americanisms . . . have crept insidiously upon 
us with the 'inevitability of gradualness' and become habits no longer noticeable 
to ourselves." These influences were far more pervasive half a century later, 
when global advertising, television, popular music, and films were dominated by 
U.S. corporations. Routine exposure to U.S. popular culture was a result as well 
as a cause of Australia's integration into U.S. commercial, industrial, advertising, 
and media circuits. More importantly, it also reflected the modernization of 
Australian society and political culture, as well as the language the two societies 
shared. Before it was tied to Washington by anti-communism and ANZUS, 
Australia had long-established sympathies for the power that was to become the 
dominant external source of its commercial culture. The growth of mass 
consumption and commercial communications media, along with shared anxi-
eties during the Cold War, extended the "future America" paradigm, and it 
remained a powerful influence on popular culture and political life. In reporting 
the Los Angeles riots of 1992 to its Australian audience, the influential Bulletin 
magazine's cover story began: "No, not a movie. This could be the future."8 
The notion that the American empire or American hegemony was sustained 
without military occupation was, of course, one that was commonly reiterated in 
the press as well as in the academic literature. Assuming that the smaller state was 
the effect, so to speak, of the American cause, modern Australia has been widely 
interpreted as part of an informal American empire. If not de jure then at least 
de facto, it is an economic, military, and cultural dependent of the Great Power. 
Australia has been variously interpreted as a "satellite" of metropolitan America, 
or as the ideological and economic victim of Americanization or American 
cultural imperialism. Nationalist commentators constantly lament Australia's 
docile collusion in this process. In Phillip Adams's view, for example, Australia 
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"has succumbed, yielded, sold-out to a cultural imperialism that makes past 
imperialisms look puny."9 
Just as Australian-American relations are understood narrowly in terms of 
a bilateral political association of unequal national states, so too is the historiog-
raphy of international relations dominated by study of the exercise of power and 
diplomacy between otherwise autonomous nations. As Akira Iriye acknowl-
edges: "the phenomenon of cultural transmission and diffusion has been studied 
more extensively by anthropologists and art historians than by diplomatic 
historians." While he concedes that "culture may become as crucial a concept of 
international affairs as security and trade," like most historians writing more 
narrowly of the Australian-American relationship, Iriye views culture as an 
independent manifestation of national character which can be understood in 
isolation from politics, economics, and even ideology.10 At the same time, 
traditional interpretations of bilateral relationships have been slow to recognize 
that less powerful nations actively negotiate influence and power, whether these 
are political, economic, or cultural. They assume that power emanates from the 
nation that is ostensibly more powerful, which then constitutes the second nation 
as its effect. But such an emphasis on bilateral power relations makes it difficult 
to understand broadly parallel developments in two nations, such as those which 
might more appropriately be labelled modernization or Westernization. If 
viewed only bilaterally, such developments are too easily explained as the simple 
consequences of unidirectional power, and labelled as "Americanization." In 
discussing Australia and the U.S. we reject unidirectional causal models, some-
times phrased in terms of "imperialism," which are initially appealing in their 
generality, but fail to capture the complexity and the genuinely interactive 
features of the relationship. Despite some important if isolated exceptions, 
ideological and cultural power and their resistance, negotiation, and accommo-
dation by Australians have been neglected by historians, as have the social and 
cultural texture of these negotiated relationships.11 
After a decade of Labor Party governments, Australians are (again) debating 
the prospect of severing constitutional ties to Britain and becoming a Republic. 
In this climate, the media have re-examined Australia's political and cultural 
relationships, with some commentators arguing that the Pacific nation is (or 
ought to be) independent of both its British colonial origins and American 
hegemony. They point out that in bilateral security arrangements, as in econom-
ics, the myth of a "special relationship" has evaporated. Australia is now "on its 
own" in a world made unpredictable by the global complexities of the 1990s. 
Without God or America on its side, Australia is coming to recognize its Asian 
and industrial realities as reflected directly from its region rather than as refracted 
through American perspectives. The press now acknowledges that the U.S. "no 
longer guarantee^] [Australia's] security, let alone its economic well-being"; 
and Australia is "no special ally for America." These observations were made by 
Time magazine in an article ironically titled Home Alone, after a popular 
8 
American movie about a child left without a baby-sitter.12 The cultural similari-
ties which were assumed by Time when addressing Australian readers under-
scored the fact that commercial culture remains one medium through which 
Australians can be spoken of by American interests outside the diplomatic 
discourses of ANZUS or GATT. Although the local edition of the American 
magazine proclaimed Australia's independence, the very existence of Time 
(Australia) signified the implication of America's global culture in that of the 
smaller nation. 
In this paper, we have chosen to use the terms "implication" and "impli-
cated" to summarize the various relationships between the greater and the lesser 
power. We hope to avoid simple formulations that see the more powerful nation 
as directly dominating, colonizing, or imperially controlling the small nation. In 
many accounts of the relationship it is taken for granted that the power of the 
larger state is directly imposed on the smaller nation, albeit, in most cases, with 
a degree of consent. Although power is clearly an essential concept in any 
analysis of this question, it is important to avoid pre-judging the issue and 
therefore to emphasize the various potentially independent domains within 
which, within Australia, American influences have been differentially effective. 
This means looking at the ways in which Australia has sought to negotiate, resist, 
modify, and accommodate the various influences to which it has been exposed. 
Although it might seem difficult to make the claim, in some areas it can also be 
argued that Australia has itself had influence on the greater power. Certainly, 
Australia usually modified and gave its own character to the relationship. 
Moreover, different analyses must be provided for the military-political sphere 
on the one hand, and for the subtleties of parallel cultural negotiations on the 
other. 
To study the impact of U.S. policies abroad, it is necessary to go beyond the 
boundaries of the Great Power and beyond the archive of intention and policy. 
The relationships between the two "Pacific" powers look very different when 
seen from within the context of the "receiving" culture—that of Australia with 
its unique traditions and interests. The tendency to aggregate American influ-
ences into a monolithic explanatory concept ("Americanization") is empirically 
simplistic: It assumes the very "effects" it seeks to explain, and could be argued 
to disempower alternative interpretations which arise from within the "weaker," 
smaller nation involved in the relationship. 
The blanket term "Americanization" is frequently no more than an assump-
tion concerning the origins of a cultural example (language, dress, food) which 
may or may not be accurate. It is applied indiscriminately within Australian 
media discourse to label an array of factors seen as threatening to national(istic) 
"identity," "way of life" or "values." This pejorative use of Americanization sees 
Australia as adopting social practices and cultural values which putatively 
originate in the USA (or in "Hollywood," "Los Angeles," or some métonymie 
reference to that nation). It assumes that the offending items are not meaningful 
within the Australian context merely because they make cultural sense to some 
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local groups, but that they carry with them their alien "American" origins. It 
follows that popular discourse on this issue is frequently nationalistic, assuming 
a uniquely Australian cultural and political identity and consensus which U.S.-
originated culture threatens. 
In more scholarly discourse, it is possible to detect elements of a similarly 
negative critique of social and cultural change thought to originate in the United 
States. In this essay we use the terms found in such discourse but do not wish to 
pre-judge either the effect these labels assume nor to align ourselves with the 
nationalistic rejection of Americanization with which they are frequently linked. 
Nevertheless, we implicitly argue that Australian responses to American power, 
influences, and example are not simply those of protective nationalism. Rather, 
they are culturally specific, active and much more complex than "national 
identity" reactions would predict. Thus, in this paper we discuss the example of 
the Cold War, in which Australian politics clearly echoed dominant U.S. policies, 
but also the example of the Australian cultural repose to the Vietnam War, in 
which the smaller Pacific nation fought as America's most servile ally. By 
comparing the most salient popular cultural forms originating in the two coun-
tries, it can be seen that Australia has constructed very different "memories" of 
Vietnam. Insofar as the Australian cinema and television industries rationalized 
and mythologized local involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict, they 
produced a distinctive reconstruction of the country's traditional values, mark-
edly different from the American films and television series which were never-
theless widely distributed within Australia during the period 1978-92. 
The need for different analyses of these political and cultural dimensions of 
Australia's relationship with the U.S. highlights the inadequacy of the assump-
tion that Americanization may be thought of as a simple cultural consequence of 
economic/political influence, even control, by a powerful U.S. From within a 
putatively imitative national culture, Australia, local history, and conditions, not 
imported cultural forms, generate local responses. 
* • * 
The paradox of cultural resistance in the face of pervasive social change and 
political accommodation was apparent in Australia from the early post-war years. 
At least at the level of public utterance, Americanization could be denied even 
when it could not be delayed. To borrow Max Lerner's observation on Europe 
in the post-war decades, Australia was "caught between the need for America and 
the recoil from it."13 Indeed, elements of this cultural schizophrenia were evident 
even in the nineteenth century. Although unable to free itself from dependence 
on American military strategy, economic priorities, and mass culture, Australia 
nonetheless has consistently attempted to define itself in distinctive national 
terms and to promote its separate national interests abroad.14 As we shall argue 
in our analysis of the relationships that developed throughout the post-war years, 
10 
Australia fluctuated between an easy deference to American power and an uneasy 
fear that its great friend might use this power selfishly or irresponsibly. Yet 
modern Australia was obviously a product of forces other than those that might 
be identified as "American." Australia's own traditions and identity, its British 
legacies, its deepening multicultural complexion from the 1950s, as well as 
distinct religious, class, and regional characteristics, formed the social grid into 
which American pressures had to be incorporated. Thus, throughout the Cold 
War, a paradoxical nationalism defined itself against what Geoffrey Série saw as 
Australia's ostensible vulnerability to Americanization.15 
At least from the election of the Menzies Liberal-Country Party coalition in 
1949, the suspicions and rhetoric of the Cold War that justified America's global 
confrontation with communism came to dominate official Australia perspectives 
and actions in foreign affairs. Independent efforts of the Labor governments of 
the 1940s may have delayed, but could not avert, a broad realignment of 
Australia's policies consistent with American perceptions in both its foreign 
policy and, to a lesser extent, domestic affairs. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
interlocking changes in international politics, economics, technology, and cul-
ture transformed Australia's links with the outside world, and relationships with 
the U.S. assumed centre stage. American influences squeezed out many of those 
long associated with the U.K. and its empire. Although the rhetoric and symbols 
of traditional ties to the mother country were not all displaced, the realignment 
of Australia towards the US was to be insistent and irreversible. As interactions 
between the two multiplied, the vast asymmetries in power and status between the 
societies biased their relationships towards American models and American 
interests.16 
Despite America's decisive role in defeating Japan, and the escalating 
tensions of the Cold War, Australia's post-war Labor government refused to 
accept that Washington's international actions were in the interests of all former 
Allies. Indeed, through the United Nations, in its continuing imperial links, and 
through bilateral diplomacy, Australia encouraged other nations to join it in 
attempting to counter, resist, or at least deflect U.S. foreign policy initiatives. As 
a small state, it felt its particular economic interests and regional ambitions stifled 
by the predominance of American power and influence in the Asia-Pacific area. 
Only gradually and against the background of an allegedly new Asian threat to 
its security in the form of communist China, did Australia accommodate itself to 
American authority in the Pacific. The war that erupted in Korea quickly became 
a brutal reminder that the divisions of the Cold War had been transferred to the 
Asia-Pacific region and would now be contested in virtually every sphere of 
international politics. Against this background, the new Australian government 
became increasingly receptive to American definitions of international threat, as 
it did to American interpretations of security issues and international politics 
more generally.17 
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As the Cold War intensified, the Asian-Pacific region joined Europe as a 
focus of superpower rivalries. Australia's foreign policies and strategic assump-
tions were radically recast by its associations with the U.S. Some on the left in 
Australia rejected the need for such a relationship and refused to view interna-
tional events through what they saw as the distorting lens of the Cold War. 
Instead, they interpreted revolutions in Asia as legitimate manifestations of 
nationalism and evidence of long-overdue social change. They criticized the 
assumption that China and North Korea (and later North Vietnam) were merely 
willing satellites of the Soviet Union, or pawns in the global contest between 
Marxism and democracy. But for members of the ruling Liberal-Country Party 
coalition, as well as the Democratic Labor Party which had recently splintered 
from the ALP, such interpretations were at best naive, at worst comfort to the 
"enemy." In the first months of war in Korea, for example, Liberal MP Paul 
Hasluck greeted his government's decision to send troops to serve under General 
MacArthur with words that clearly echoed official U.S. statements: "This 
expansionist, imperialistic and aggressive policy of the Soviet Union must be 
resisted wherever it is exemplified."18 
The tenor and direction of Australia's policies in the period framed by the 
wars in Korea and Vietnam were expressed by Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
in discussions with his cabinet in 1958. Australia must not disagree publicly with 
the U.S., he stated, and Australia's defense forces must be geared to fight 
alongside those of its great and powerful friends. Independence in policy 
formulation, or military-strategic activity, was rejected. 'The greatest practical 
fact of life for Australia is that we are in no danger of conquest, either directly or 
indirectly, except from Communist aggression," Menzies observed. "fOlur 
doctrine at a time of crisis should be "Great Britain and the United States right or 
wrong." He continued: "The simple truth, therefore, is that we cannot afford to 
run counter to their policies at a time when a crisis has arisen."19 Surprisingly, this 
observation came after the Suez crisis of 1956 had exposed the impossibility of 
simultaneously courting two great and powerful friends in the event of a 
disagreement between them. This crisis, along with events in Malaya, South 
Africa, and Indonesia, confronted Australia with additional difficulties as it 
attempted to embrace British imperial policies without alienating its.powerful 
new Cold War partner in the Pacific. 
As wars in Vietnam revealed, the decolonization of much of Asia was a 
protracted and bloody contest that ultimately drew the U.S. and Australia deeply 
into the region in a struggle against nationalist and communist movements. These 
movements generally enjoyed wide local support as they led the struggles to 
overthrow European colonial authority and create more egalitarian, sovereign 
states. But nationalist victories over the French during 1953-64 were won as Cold 
War rivalries intensified throughout Asia. To the Cold Warriors in Washington 
and Canberra, peasant nationalism had become merely a euphemism for commu-
nist subversion. In Australia, deep-rooted anxieties about Asian expansion and 
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"racial contamination" were now mixed with ideological alarm over the expan-
sion of communism in what came to be called the "Near North." The Menzies 
government, along with most Australians, understood communism as a mono-
lithic movement that had spread from the USSR to Eastern Europe, China, and 
the wider Asian region. Communities once obscure to Western interests, notably 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were interpreted as precarious strategic "domi-
noes" by Australian officials now locked into the ideological imperatives of the 
Cold War. Justifying his government's decision to send troops to Vietnam, 
Menzies echoed this familiar argument. "The takeover of South Vietnam would 
be direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South-East 
Asia," he said. "It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans." Should one domino fall, all the others would 
topple in quick succession.20 
Throughout the period of conservative government in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the symbols of Empire and Mother England were often invoked to placate those 
disturbed by the new direction in Australia's foreign policy. Yet even the cloying 
Empire rhetoric of Menzies could not conceal this dramatic change in direction. 
Imperial relations were not the only casualties of Australia's orientation towards 
the US. Many Australians who had anticipated that dependence on Great Britain 
would be replaced by a vibrant regionalism and independence in defense and 
foreign affairs, along the lines suggested by Curtin and Evatt in the 1940s, viewed 
with dismay their nation's reliance on American leadership and power. Oppor-
tunities for regional initiatives—perhaps even "non-alignment" as pursued by 
many recently decolonised nations—were lost as Australia transferred it alle-
giances from one "great and powerful friend" to another.21 
Initially, as the private musings of Menzies indicate, many Australians 
promoted a close public military relationship with Washington while they spoke 
disparagingly in private of America and Americans, and clung longingly to the 
culture of Britain and the Empire or celebrated their distinctive "Australianness." 
However, by the mid 1960s military dependence on America was encouraged 
both publicly and privately in the language of the Holt and Gorton administra-
tions. Later governments were sometimes less effusive. The Labor administra-
tions of Whitlam ( 1972-75), and to a lesser degree Fraser' s Liberal-Country Party 
government (1975-82), did not blindly follow American leadership on all 
matters. Under Labor, particularly, the alliance was exposed to new tensions as 
Australia sought a more autonomous role in global affairs, anticipated U.S. policy 
by recognizing the People's Republic of China, and immediately withdrew its 
forces from Vietnam. But from the early 1960s until the late 1980s, examples of 
Australian independence or dissent from American initiatives and perceptions 
were fairly rare. Ironically, as recent disclosures in West Irian and Vietnam 
reveal, before Labor's brief period in office Australia's most forceful initiatives 
in foreign affairs sought not to offset American power, but to increase America's 
presence in Asia and bolster its military effort against communism in the region. 
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It has been argued recently that Australia deliberately exploited American anti-
communism and Cold War fears in order to draw this powerful nation into 
ANZUS and later into Vietnam.22 This interpretation dramatically exaggerates 
Australia's influence on Washington. It also ignores the powerful interests and 
perceptions that motivated American initiatives in Japan, China, Indo-China, and 
the Pacific from 1945 to 1975. But it does correctly highlight Australia's 
determination to embrace a new protector from the early 1950s. If this initiative 
was considered consistent with Australia's perceived security interests, it none-
theless narrowed the foreign policy options Australia could subsequently pursue. 
By constantly emphasizing the centrality of the American alliance to its foreign 
policies, Australia undermined its own capacity to bargain with the U.S. While 
always anxious to demonstrate its reliability as an ally, Australian governments, 
both Liberal and Labor, found it difficult to dissent from American actions or to 
resist American pressure for military support. 
Occasionally, this docile emulation has been interrupted by independent 
assessments and initiatives—most notably the Whitlam Labor government's 
prompt withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and recognition of China, and more 
recently the efforts of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments to challenge 
America's protectionist agricultural policies and to promote independent initia-
tives over such diverse issues as Antarctica, Cambodia, and chemical weapons. 
But, in general, Australia until the late 1980s followed America's initiatives and 
endorsed the rationale on which such policies were based. 
Notwithstanding the apparent military, political, and economic alliances and 
co-operation between the U.S. and Australia throughout the Cold War, it is not 
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culture, Australia uniformly or dependently became "Americanized" as a result.23 
This is most clearly evidenced in relation to the significance and meaning which 
the so-called Vietnam War has been given in Australian culture compared to its 
dominant construction in the culture of the U.S. Despite the alliance between the 
U.S. and Australia which brought the two nations into day-to-day cooperation, 
and despite ostensibly similar domestic conflicts over communism, the Cold 
War, the prosecution of the war in Vietnam and military conscription, Australian 
culture (especially its "popular" culture) has interpreted and remembered the 
Vietnam war period, the events and their significance, very differently from its 
American counterpart. The difference between the two countries' respective 
"memories" of the period are reminders that culture always involves the active 
construction of meaning by its participant members, that the argument that one 
culture might simply impose itself on another, imitative culture, is very difficult 
to sustain.24 
By the 1970s and 1980s, Australians, large numbers of whom had no 
personal memory of the Vietnam War, had been exposed to many hours of film 
and television presenting particular interpretations of America's involvement in 
that South-East Asian conflict. At the same time, Australian cinema and 
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television (to the extent that it dealt with the conflict at all) sought to construct 
another history of just this period, one in which America was represented partly 
as Australia's enemy. Even in this recent example, it could be argued that the 
formal relationships between Australia and America in the actual military and 
strategic sphere of the Vietnam War, have had cultural ramifications that reach 
beyond the particular period of that political and military alliance. In seeking to 
understand the relationships between the two nations, even in the recent past, it 
is important to examine these cultural as well as political dimensions, and not to 
assume that what is held in the archive and studied by the traditional historian 
exhausts the significance of the relationships in question. 
The cultural legacy of Vietnam to the U.S. is partly embodied in the many 
Hollywood movies which sought to reconcile America to this defeat, beginning 
with The Deer Hunter and Coming Home (1978) and continuing through to China 
Beach and Tour of Duty (shown on Australian television in the late 1980s).25 A 
necessarily brief comparison of the American and Australian cinematic and 
televisual remembering of Vietnam shows very clearly how, despite the repeated, 
almost continuous exposure to American popular culture, Australia produced 
contrasting images of this period. Moreover, the Australian films represented 
America and Americans, as well as Vietnam and Asia, quite differently. In this 
way, Australian television mini-series and movies provided a representation of 
"what America means" in the post-Vietnam period. This cultural meaning is 
paradoxical and linked to formal aspects of the U.S.-Australia relationship. 
Until Vietnam, the American involvement in modern war had been uncom-
plicated by defeat and uncompromised by moral or political ambiguities suffi-
cient to cause major rifts in public assent to the legitimacy of the war efforts. 
Australia had similarly supported the victorious Allies in the two World Wars and 
Korea. But its nationalistic pride has usually been epitomized by valiant defeats, 
where mateship and "battling" could compensate for otherwise pointless losses. 
Conflict over conscription had split the nation fifty years before Vietnam, and the 
Boer War involvement by pro-British Australians was less easily rationalized as 
having God on its side than was either the First or Second World War commit-
ments. However, in the 1960s both the U.S. and Australia had to come to terms 
with the moral contradictions of supporting a succession of failed South Viet-
namese regimes. Each also had to deal with its own internal political conflict over 
intervention in Asia, as well as conscription. Finally, the relationship between the 
two allies "invited" to prevent the South East Asian dominoes from tumbling 
towards Australia was always tense and continually being re-negotiated.26 
Fictional film and television have always found political and historical 
analysis difficult, given the conventions of Holly wood. Vietnam films proved no 
exception. Put very simply, Hollywood subsumed Vietnam to American popular 
cultural paradigms which repeated the stories of other, earlier genres. It ignored 
the contradictions and complexity of the period which culminated in the war. 
Australian popular cinema of the 1970s and 1980s virtually avoided Vietnam 
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completely. The only widely released local film set in Vietnam, however, is 
significantly different from its American counterparts and indicates some of the 
ways Australians have been invited to see their own involvement. 
The Odd Angry Shot (Australia, 1979) did not see war as apocalyptic and 
transcendental, nor as a theatre for the clash of Good and Evil. The biblical and 
the metaphysical connotations of America's Vietnam films were ignored in favor 
of earthy, scatological humor, the mundane necessity to kill in order to survive, 
and a detached, ironic stoicism shown by a cross-section of ordinary blokes— 
blokes played by a virtual who's who of "Aussie" actors of the time. It is 
significant that early in this film, the Aussie camp is attacked, suggesting that 
"our" boys, the Americans' allies, are not the aggressors. Yet the Asian enemy 
is curiously invisible, and the Americans themselves become Australia's sym-
bolic enemy defined in terms of sporting competition, which allows the under-
dog diggers to assert their value by contrast with the more powerful "Yanks." 
Deeply ethnocentric, The Odd Angry Shot contrasts the innocent mateship of 
Aussies to the power of America and the incomprehensible corruption of the 
Vietnamese. The principal character's reference to Vietnam as "this tossed-up,-
up never-come-down land" epitomizes this resigned but perversely comic 
attempt to stay Australian in the alien world of Asia. Vaguely critical of authority 
(the "they" who sent the troops in), while celebrating ordinary mateship, the film 
is as populist as it is determined to avoid any engagement with the very questions 
its "shit-shovellers" ask about why they are there, or about class or politics in any 
form. The nearest the film comes to critical reflection is the cynical, self-
congratulatory jokes by which morale, masculinity, and mateship are main-
tained. If America's Vietnam films saw the enemy as "within," Australia's films 
largely displaced the enemy onto a symbolic power against which an innocent, 
populist heroism-of-the-underdog could be asserted. The shadows of nationalist 
Australian leaders, Prime Minister Billy Hughes at Versaille, and Prime Minister 
John Curtin and Dr. H.V. Evatt in the 1940s, stretched across these films. 
Whereas many American-produced movies such as The Deer Hunter ( 1978) 
were centered on the powerful male hero, or the rite of passage (especially 
Platoon), on the nation reconciled, and on the alien Asian culture and enemy, 
Australian television dramas presented a more ambivalent and vulnerable hero.27 
They saw the family as the social unit torn apart by Vietnam and therefore in need 
of reunification, and constructed the Asian enemy very differently. The Austra-
lian television series presented the U.S. and its soldiers themselves as an enemy, 
or at least they contrasted them with Australian servicemen, to the advantage of 
the locals, of course. Vietnam: The Mini-series (1987) lists four sets of dramatis 
personae. Significantly these begin with "The Family," then come "The 
Politicians," "The Soldiers," and "The Friends." The nostalgic 1960s montage 
of old advertisements, news clips, and pop stars which opens the series is set to 
the pop song "to everything there is a season and a time to every purpose under 
heaven " This nostalgic fatalism sets the somewhat resigned mood which the 
series seems content to rely on for its general emotional force. Against these 
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filtered recollections of the 1960s, the Goddards' family drama plays out various 
positions on the Vietnam conflict—the father's support for government interven-
tion changing to its opposite; the mother's and daughter's liberalism turning to 
active opposition; the volunteer soldier son's experiences leading to alienation, 
cynicism and aggression. Finally, however, the family accepts the experience 
and painful growth of the war period to emerge tentatively united, the son 
accepted by, and accepting of, the family. 
However, it is in its treatment of the Vietnamese that the mini-series offers 
a more complex, less clearly ethnocentric image of the war than do its cinematic 
counterparts from the U.S. Phil Goddard's love for a Vietnamese woman, from 
whom he is separated by the war, and her subsequent death as a Viet-Cong at the 
hands of the Australian soldiers, constitute a rather trite sub-plot. Yet the 
Vietnamese villagers are portrayed as human, humane, and politically sophisti-
cated. The savage rape of a second Vietnamese woman by U.S. soldiers and her 
later attempts to relate to the insularity and insensitivity of suburban Sydney are 
overtly critical of "us" Australians, if rather condescendingly sentimental about 
the Vietnamese. It is significant that the innocent victims of the war, women and 
children, become the acceptable representatives of the Vietnamese which allows 
Australia to be distinguished from what the mini-series sees as the excessive 
brutality of America. 
Our necessarily brief discussion of Australian-produced popular cultural 
rememberings of Vietnam is not intended to illuminate mainland U.S. readings 
of the war and its aftermath. Rather, we emphasize that within the putatively 
Americanized Australian society, arguably very different discourses circulated, 
discourses grounded in the local culture, including its traditional anti-heroic, 
collectivist strands. The claim that Australia is in some sense a "ventriloquist's 
dummy"28 for powerful U.S. culture is refuted by-such examples. Significantly, 
it is in cases in which U.S. media appear so imperially present in the local culture 
that their meanings may be most explicitly challenged by indigenous alternatives. 
What "Vietnam" or "America" meant was not determined by the ostensibly 
hegemonic Hollywood cycle of films which became ironic counterpoints, not 
imposed models, for local cultures. 
This is not to imply that all, or a majority of "typical" Australian citizens 
share a simple consensus around these issues. The popularity of local film and 
television explorations of post-Vietnam adjustment, however, does itself indi-
cate that Australian popular culture actively reconstructed complex, perhaps 
contradictory memories of this period which local audiences understood but 
which would make little sense to British or U.S. audiences. Local film and 
television was not merely "anti-American," it was culturally significant beyond 
such limited nationalism. 
Australian military support for the U.S. in Vietnam has been remembered by 
Australia's recent movies and television as a reluctant alliance.29 The U.S. has 
been painted as excessive, even barbaric, in local versions of the war. By contrast, 
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American films such as Platoon and Good Morning Vietnam have been widely 
distributed in Australia, providing a more positive representation of America 
"finding itself in the jungles of Asia. These examples suggest that the degree and 
quality of cultural Americanization through even a period in which American 
media were highly visible in Australia depend on local accommodations, includ-
ing resistances to, and re-interpretations of, what "America" means in the local, 
receiving culture. Second, Australia's response to the Vietnam experience shows 
that military and political co-operation, bordering on acquiescence, need not be 
translated into cultural imitation or dependence. Culture is dynamic, inconsis-
tent, and rooted in the soil of the society whose meanings and values it expresses. 
• • * 
"What is modern," Bruce Grant has claimed, "always comes from America 
and is always replaced by America: only America can both create and destroy." 
He concluded pessimistically that these are "harsh terms" for Australia to 
negotiate.30 However, the implication of the U.S. in Australia provokes active 
negotiation, albeit negotiation which has frequently been conducted within the 
language and culture of the greater power, and within global structures in which 
Australia has exhibited ostensibly very little power. Despite this, when studied 
from the perspective of the supposedly servile or imitative lesser power, negotia-
tion, resistance, and cultural independence may be seen. This is evident even 
during the Cold War period when the more distant view might see only 
unidirectional power at work. 
Neither strategic agreements nor profound economic change, and certainly 
not cultural interpretation, constituted "Americanization" in the sense that they 
were imposed on Australia by power from abroad. Relations in every field were 
negotiated and modifications won which were appropriate to Australia's increas-
ingly subtle interests as it sought material support and nationalistic meanings in 
the old and the new English-speaking empires. To conclude, any simple 
chronology of the post-war implications of the U.S. in and for Australia is 
complicated by various processes which do not simply reflect inequalities of 
power. These include the many levels of material and cultural interaction 
between the two nations and the fact that more general modernizing and 
globalizing changes have driven both the U.S. and Australia from the late 
nineteenth century at least. Furthermore, the particular nationality of ownership 
of the culture industries and of retail or other consumer industries is not 
necessarily an indicator of their significance in the "receiving" culture, as we 
have seen in the Vietnam example. Finally, because power is always negotiated, 
even between apparently unequal allies, it may be resisted overtly or covertly, 
directly or indirectly. 
Culture is a dynamic condition of social life, not just its "reflection," so 
negotiation, resistances, and accommodations between interacting cultures can 
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be seen at all periods of their history. These are particularly evident in the 
contradictions in which America has been embedded in Australian discourses 
which construct the larger nation as a model for the smaller. As "Australia's 
future," the U.S. has been represented in both Utopian and dystopian terms. 
America has been seen as the locus of progressive idealizations and of threatening 
nightmares alike; as the positive promise and as the negative fate of its little 
antipodean brother. Both of these conflicting narratives interpreted the U.S. as 
an extreme version of a projected Australian future. Many examples of this can 
be cited: in Australia, in the 1890s and a century later, "Republicanism" was and 
is generally seen in the example of the U.S., "Presidentialism" likewise, whether 
endorsed or rejected; Australian cultural industries, like the cinema, even 
individual artists, were judged in terms of potential U.S. success; criminal and 
political corruption from Al Capone to Watergate were seen as the models 
towards which Australia was heading. More recently, American serial killers 
have been characterized as the limit point of violent tendencies in our own 
society, while social contagion imagery associated with drug use has been widely 
cited to represent "our" future following the American example.31 In these 
"extreme future" scenarios, Australian popular discourse may turn cliches from 
the U.S. against themselves, or it may embrace them as its own fate. Because 
discourses of both positive and negative Americanization have had as their sub-
text various other discourses of "modernization," these proclamations of, and 
laments for, Australia as "a future America" may emphasize either the gleaming 
promise of modernity or the barbarism of an economically-driven consumerism. 
C.W.E. Bigsby has argued that Americanization is a label applied to the 
processes tied to the processes of mass reproduction, urbanization, industrializa-
tion, and consumerism, appropriate in a world "for whom the modern experience 
is coeval with the American experience." Cultures quite different from that of 
Australia have lamented or welcomed Americanization, which "frequently 
means little more than the incidence of change."32 American entertainment has 
always evoked reactions that accused it of "levelling down" high standards of 
literate and musical culture, but it also produced a rich array of non-elite cultural 
enjoyments as the by-products of material progress and modernization. More 
importantly, because culture involves shared and contested meanings and values, 
Australian cultural negotiations with imported examples are distinct and rarely 
imitative. Materially, as well as symbolically, Australia may have become 
another America, but only in the sense that it is another modern, Western state. 
It is "other," and therefore different, yet expresses similar world-historical 
processes. Australia is not made in America's image, is not a dependent satellite. 
Nor is it a simple effect of the "great power." To see it as "Americanized" greatly 
overestimates the strength of America's global reach since 1945. But America 
has been deeply implicated in many spheres of "that other America's" political 
and cultural life. America has also come to symbolize the very processes of social 
and cultural modernization themselves. Yet tension, resistance, adaptation, and 
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even indifference have characterised the various relationships between America 
and Australia since the Second World War. 
Other modern nations have also been touched by American example and 
allegiance—by its "soft" or "hard" authority abroad. Like Australia, however, 
they should not be interpreted as unwitting victims of America's transforming 
power. 
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